Opinion : The economics of bankruptcy by Kartik Athreya
F
ew people seriously challenge the idea that there
should be some form of personal bankruptcy protec-
tion. In most circles it’s taken for granted that the
availability of an option allowing people to erase their debts
is a proper response to the hazards of modern-day financial
life. The elderly get sick and can’t pay their medical bills.
Young mothers get divorced and are awarded sole custody of
their children — and then they lose their jobs. Bankruptcy is
the ultimate safety net.
Reforms signed into law this spring by President Bush
make it harder for individuals to walk away from their debts.
But the new rules don’t address this basic question: From an
economic perspective, is bankruptcy protection — even after
the latest overhaul — really sensible?
The answer is not perfectly straightforward. But recent
research, including some of my own, leads me to be skeptical
about what economists call the “welfare-improving” virtues
of bankruptcy, particularly for non-entrepreneurs. By that 
I mean the wider costs of maintaining the personal 
bankruptcy system appear to outstrip the benefits.
At its heart, personal bankruptcy
is an insurance program. It aims to
provide a backstop against financial
misfortune for which there exist few
private-sector alternatives. Drivers
can be insured against accidents
because it’s relatively easy for insur-
ers to assess the level of risk each
driver represents. But it’s not as easy
to size up a person’s financial risk.
How hard an unemployed person is
looking for new work, for example, is tricky for an outsider
to gauge. So instead of private insurance, we have opted 
for a de facto government-mandated insurance program in
bankruptcy protection.
The problem with this system is that it raises costs for
everybody. In particular, it raises the cost of unsecured credit
— chiefly, credit cards and bills for medical care — for the
people who most need it, young people and poor people,
both of whom usually lack collateral. 
The law says that people have a right to avoid unsecured
debts by seeking bankruptcy protection. Creditors know that
everybody they lend to has this option. It’s expensive to bor-
row in this kind of world because lenders must charge extra
for the very real possibility that they won’t be able to fully col-
lect. In effect, bankruptcy law disables those who possess few
assets from making commitments to fully repay debts.
Why do we foist this “protection” on all households? 
If we lived in a society that allowed borrowing but forbade
defaulting under any circumstances (an admittedly extreme
and unrealistic scenario) it would become significantly cheaper
to borrow. In the models I’ve looked at, the gains accruing per
U.S. household would be equivalent to as much as $280 a year.
These gains encompass everything from cheaper borrowing
costs to eliminating after-the-fact punishments like stigma.
Another way to see this is to consider the difference
between borrowing on a home equity line versus a credit
card. The roughly 10 percent wedge in interest rates between
home equity lines, which are backed by the collateral of prop-
erty, and credit cards, which are unsecured, is a striking
indicator of the value of a credible commitment to repay
debts. On a loan of $10,000, this “credibility gap” may cost
unsecured borrowers $1,000 more annually than their collat-
eralized counterparts.
Given the large costs bankruptcy law imposes on house-
holds, especially poor ones, there is too much at stake to
allow policy to be guided by the current, somewhat hysteri-
cal debate. What I want is a policy debate that relies less on
emotionally charged stories about tragically unlucky filers or
wealthy abusers of the system. We
must focus more on a careful and
hard-headed accounting of bank-
ruptcy’s actual costs and benefits.
Roughly 1 million U.S. households
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy pro-
tection last year. Tougher bankruptcy
eligibility rules than those that have
been presented so far would improve
the terms and availability of credit
for all Americans. In particular, such
rules would benefit the 60 million people between the ages
of 20 and 35 who today face the highest costs in obtaining
unsecured credit.
In a world of competing and evolving insurance programs,
does personal bankruptcy still serve us well? Among econo-
mists addressing these questions, there is an emerging
consensus against bankruptcy as it’s currently practiced. But
this conclusion leaves the door open for some extreme cases
— sudden medical setbacks in particular. More generally, 
we should think harder about other ways to help people 
facing catastrophic health events.  
That may be just another way of saying that I believe 
we should offer some form of bankruptcy, albeit with 
strings attached. Means-testing, while piecemeal, seems like
a small step in the right direction. The more fundamental
task of understanding bankruptcy’s redistributive- and
incentive-related implications remains squarely in front of
both lawmakers and researchers. RF
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